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 The Time of the Oligarch.  
Relations Between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova (2009-2018)1 
 
ARMAND GOȘU* 
(University of Bucharest) 
 
 
Abstract 
This article aims to present the evolution of relations between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova over the last decade, in the period between “the Twitter 
revolution” and the summer of 2018, the moment when there was a dramatic cooling of 
relations between the European Union, the United States, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Bank, on the one hand, and Moldova on the other. In this article 
we also analyze the way in which Romania has reacted to Moldova's side skids and try 
to make sense of the extent to which the government in Bucharest may be considered 
responsible for the transformation of Moldova from the success story of the Eastern 
Partnership into a captive state, as it is considered today.  
 
Keywords: foreign policy, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Plahotniuc.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Between 2009 and 2013, the Republic of Moldova was perhaps one of the 
most important projects of Romania's foreign policy, with the aim of modernizing 
the neighboring state and bringing it closer to the European Union (EU). Initially 
this was seen with suspicion and mistrust, based on the assertion that the real aim 
was to restore the Greater Romania of the interwar period, when the territory of the 
former Soviet republic annexed by Stalin in 1940 was a part of the Kingdom of 
Romania. However, Bucharest managed to convince its partners that it can act in a 
constructive manner. A favorable international context and a reforming and pro-
European government in Chișinău made the Republic of Moldova a success story 
of the Eastern Partnership, which was launched in May 2009 at the EU summit in 
                                               
*  Armand Goșu is Associate Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Bucharest 
(armand.gosu@fspub.unibuc.ro). 
1  This article is an extended version of our article published in Romanian, “Prizonierii lui 
Plahotniuc. Relațiile dintre România și Republica Moldova”, Contributors, 3 August 
2018, http://www.contributors.ro/administratie/prizonerii-lui-plahotniuc-relațiile-dintre-
romania-și-republica-moldova/. 
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Prague. Moldova – in part thanks to Romania – has become a new favorite, but also 
consolation, for the West, disappointed with the evolution of the “orange 
revolution” in Kiev, and afflicted by “Ukraine fatigue”. 
Before 2009 as well, but especially after the pro-Europeans came to 
power in Chișinău, Romania promoted in the West, more or less efficiently, 
more or less intelligently, the Moldova case. At the same time, the situation in 
Moldova has degraded dramatically and Romania continued to deliver 
narratives about reforms and democratization, stories that were accepted for a 
while, with no critical spirit, by the other governments. When it became evident 
that the political, economic and social situations are deeply degraded, and that 
the stories delivered by Romanian diplomacy had no real basis, a closer 
monitoring and conditioning of financial help and loans started.  
The invalidation of the elections for the mayor of Chișinău, won on the 3rd 
of June 2018 by Andrei Năstase, one of the leaders of the anti-oligarchic and pro-
European opposition, was a turning moment in the relations between European 
institutions and the Republic of Moldova. The European Parliament and the 
European Commission, the European External Action Service, have reacted in 
unison, not just by criticizing Chișinău, but also suspending loan payments. The 
only one that didn’t react was Romania, who, with this gesture, suggests that it 
continues to support the oligarchic regime installed in the Republic of Moldova. 
This article analyzes the evolution of the relations between Romania 
and the Republic of Moldova over the last decade (2009-2018), trying to 
decipher the underpinnings of the change in the paradigm of Romanian 
diplomacy along this period. We also examine the way in which Romania has 
reacted to Moldova’s side skids and try to make sense of the extent to which the 
government in Bucharest may be considered responsible for the transformation 
of Moldova from the success story of the Eastern Partnership into a captive 
state, as it is considered today2. This article provides an initial narrative 
regarding the relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova in the 
period between “the Twitter revolution” and the summer of 2018, the moment 
when there was a dramatic cooling of relations between the EU, the United 
States (US), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, on 
the one hand, and Moldova on the other. 
 
 
The Theoretical Framework 
And The Context Of The Relationship 
 
In what concerns the theoretical framework of the study, the first 
important element concerns the European Union as a “normative power”. I 
                                               
2  The first important foreign dignitary who formulated this conclusion was Thorbjørn 
Jagland, General Secretary of the Council of Europe, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/11/opinion/bring-moldova-back-from-the-brink.html. (Accessed 15 July 2018).  
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argue the normative action of the EU, joined by Romania in 2007, failed by 
consolidating in the Republic of Moldova a “patronalist” type of regime, as 
defined by Henry Hale3. The second consideration refers to the approach taken 
by the Bucharest government in its bilateral relation with Chișinău, within the 
limits of a hybrid theoretical construction in regard to regional security, from a 
realistic perspective combined with a historicist perspective, which is a guiding 
line in the Romanian approach of the last few decades. We consider that the 
“normative” approach has dominated the Romanian institutions’ tactic in the 
period between the autumn of 2009 and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 
March 2014. This includes the initialing of the Association Agreement and the 
Free Trade Association between the EU and Moldova at the Vilnius Eastern 
Partnership in November 2013. A second stage started dramatically in the spring 
of 2014, with the destabilization of the south and east of Ukraine, in what was 
called once Novorossyia, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula during the 
spring and summer of 2014, continuing to this day.  
The period between the autumn of 2009 and the summer of 2018 started 
with the Treaty of Lisbon of December 2009, which brought several important 
changes to the EU foreign action: the position of High Representative of the EU 
for Foreign and Security Policy was created, with the foundation being laid for 
the European External Action Service.  
The EU acts in the international arena, in its southern and eastern 
vicinity, as a normative power4. This paradigm allows us to analyze the Eastern 
Partnership as part of external normative action by which the EU promotes 
values in relation to third parties. From this perspective, the EU is, first and 
foremost, “a changer of norms” in its eastern and southern vicinity.  
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) deals with no less than 
sixteen countries. In the South it deals with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and Lebanon. In the East 
it deals with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. In 
the first years of implementation, the ENP proved to be far from the success it 
was expected to be. The main reason was the difference between the East and 
the South, regions of different sizes and with dissimilar problems. The first 
attempt to adjust the approach came from Germany, which launched the ENP 
Plus, a new concept, which Berlin tried to promote during its presidency.  
                                               
3  Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 372-420. The concept of “patronage” 
is particularly useful in analyzing the evolution of politics in Moldova. Professor Hale, 
however, goes no further than 2012. 
4  Ian Manners, “As You Like It: European Union Normative Power in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.) The European 
Neighbourhood Policy Since 2003. Much Ado about Nothing? Palgrave, Basingstoke, 
2009, pp. 29-50.  
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In April 2007, during the German presidency, the European 
Commission gave a green light to a regional project, The Black Sea Synergy5, 
addressed to Romania and Bulgaria (EU member states), to Turkey (a EU 
candidate state), to Russia (a EU strategic partner), and to other five ex-Soviet 
states: Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. On the 14th of 
February 2008, at a special conference organized in Kiev by the EU, attended 
by foreign ministers from the Black Sea Basin, they launched the Black Sea 
Synergy, the first project for regional coagulation as part of the ENP.6 It was for 
the first time when in the eastern vicinity a multilateral framework was built to 
allow cooperation with Russia, still seen as an important strategic partner for the 
EU, and to create a mechanism of cooperation with Turkey. Black Sea Synergy 
was the first major project after the creation of the multilateral frameworks 
forming the basis of the neighborhood policy7.  
Once ten Central European countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the border of the West practically moved to the 
old border of the Soviet Union. After this fifth historic expansion, the EU 
started to rethink the relationship it had with its neighbors. The tense regional 
context in Eastern Europe8 produced by the five-days war, between Russia and 
Georgia in August 2008, as well as the gas crises between Russia and Ukraine, 
rushed the crystallization of a new project9. With Poland and Sweden at the 
helm, through their foreign ministers, Radek Sikorski and Card Bild, the new 
project was entitled the Eastern Partnership (EaP), aimed at former Soviet 
republics, three in Eastern Europe, Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, 
and three in Southern Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. The Eastern 
Partnership was launched at the EU summit in Prague (7 May 2009), in a joint 
statement10. The initiative did not offer the former Soviet republics the 
                                               
5  “Black Sea Synergy: Approaches for a deeper cooperation”, November 2007, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_12344-1522-2-30.pdf?071120084243. (Accessed 18 July 
2018).  
6  “Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the European 
Union and of the wider Black Sea area”, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/ 
docs/blacksea/doc/joint_statement_blacksea_en.pdf. (Accessed 18 June 2018).  
7  Elena Korosteleva, The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours. Towards a more 
ambitious partnership?, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, pp. 20-38; Georgiana 
Martinezgarnelo y Calvo, “The Eastern Partnership as an expression of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: reinforcing the European normative power with the Eastern partners”, 
in Eastern Journal of European Studies, volume 5, issue 1, June 2014, pp. 132-133. 
8  Vasile Rotaru, “Russia’s ‘Contribution’ to the Inception of the Eastern Partnership”, in 
Studia politica. Romanian Polical Science Review, col. XIV, no. 2/2014, pp. 236-240.  
9  Jeanne Park, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership”, March 14 2014, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/european-unions-eastern-partnership. (Accessed 18 
June 2018). The establishment of the Eastern Partnership “to reaffirm the EU’s 
commitment to the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus following the 
August 2009 Russia-Georgia war and the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute”.  
10  “The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 2009”, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf. 
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perspective of joining the EU, which reduced the EaP's capacity to attract and 
mobilize. The benefits of being a part of the EaP should not be underestimated, 
however. Six countries with a population of 75 million people, using a free trade 
zone, can access a market of 500 million consumers, the biggest and richest in 
the world.  
Eastern expansion of the Euro-Atlantic institutions troubled and angered 
Russia. NATO's expansion to the East was perceived as a direct threat, something 
uttered clearly by President Vladimir Putin, in April 2008, at the NATO summit in 
Bucharest. The assault on Georgia, recognizing the separatist regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, was a response to Ukraine and Georgia's attempt to join 
NATO. EaP could not dispel Russia's fear that the EU wants to keep marching 
East, even in absence of the military dimension of NATO. 
A decisive fact in the EaP's destiny was the evolution of the situation in 
Ukraine. Since independence and up to 2014, Ukraine has oscillated between 
the West and Russia, exploiting opportunities wherever it could11. In the autumn 
of 2013, the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit was supposed to be held. 
Ready for endorsement were the association agreements between the EU and 
three EaP states. The president Viktor Yanukovich announced in 2013 that Kiev 
would comply with requirements from Brussels, preparing to sign the 
agreement. At that point, Putin put pressure on Yanukovich and threatened 
Ukraine with unilateral economic sanctions and with cutting off gas deliveries. 
In exchange for getting closer to Russia, giving up the Vilnius agreement with 
the EU, and staying within Russia's sphere of influence, Moscow promised a 16 
billion USD loan, and 33% discount on imported gas. In a not so far future, 
Ukraine was supposed to join the Eurasian Economic Union12. Brussels did not 
correctly assess Russia's reaction to Ukraine joining the EaP, and responded to 
Moscow's move with a conciliatory policy. “The EU cast the partnership as a 
bureaucratic and economic project, without sufficiently mapping out the politics 
to prepare for certain contingencies”13 which was to become evident only after 
Crimea was occupied.  
The crisis in Ukraine was supposed to force a serious analysis of the 
results, and a relaunch of the EaP. Which did not occur. Some sector policies 
were adjusted on the fly, and the ambitions of the project were reduced14. 
                                                                                                                   
(Accessed 17 June 2018). At point 2: “The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to 
create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic 
integration between the European Union and interested partner countries.”  
11  Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Valentina Feklyunina, “Belarus, Ukraine and Russia: 
East or West?”, The British Journal of politics and International relations, vol. XII, 2010, 
pp. 347-362.  
12  Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis. What it means for the West, Yale University Press, 2014, 
pp. 63-65.  
13  Jeanne Park, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership”. (Accessed 18 June 2018).  
14  JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, “Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 
2020 Focusing on key priorities and tangible results”, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/eap_20_deliverables_for_2020.pdf. (Accessed 19 June 2018). 
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Emphasis was moved on economic development and diversification, access to 
infrastructure and business financing, and on creating jobs. The consolidation of 
institutions and good governance remained a priority of the EU in the EaP 
countries, and the functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms was believed to be 
crucial for development. Increasing the quality of the justice system, increasing 
transparency by expanding citizen participation in decision-making, are 
admirable aims, but have too little traction at grassroots level15. 
Analysts evaluate the results yielded by the EaP very differently, and the 
recommendations are also very diverse16. Some are limited to very technical 
evaluations, almost incomprehensible, but even the harshest critics admit that obvious 
progress has been made in countries like the Republic of Moldova and Georgia17. 
This is the general framework for the evolution of the Republic of 
Moldova in the last decade. None of the advantages it had, counted enough to 
make a difference for Moldova. On the contrary, in its case the transition 
seemed to be even more difficult than in the other former Soviet republics. The 
Baltic countries, which went into the USSR in 1940, along with Moldova, have 
weathered transition successfully, and have joined NATO and the EU over a 
decade and a half ago18. 
 
 
An Overview Of The Bilateral Relationship Between Romania 
And Moldova 
 
The bilateral relationship between Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova has worked in the last decade based on two paradigms. The tipping 
point was the spring of 2014, the period between the moment Russia annexed 
Crimea, followed by the signing in Brussels of the Association Agreement and 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA). The first period, 
2009-2014, was dominated by a “normative” approach, in which Romanian 
diplomacy contributed significantly to the transfer of community acquis from 
the EU to Chișinău. A second stage (2014-2018), dominated by a realistic 
                                               
15  “2017 Eastern Partnership Summit: Stronger together”, Brussels, 24 November 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4845_en.htm. (Accessed 18 June 2018).  
16  Hans Martin Sieg, “Between Geopolitics and Transformation: Challenges and 
Perspectives for the Eastern Partnership”, in DGAP analyse, no. 10/November 2016, 16 
pp.; “European Eastern Partnership: Recommendations for a Refined Approach. From 
Brussels Forum to the Riga Conference”, 28 pp.  
17  Jeanne Park, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership”. (Accessed 18 June 2018).  
18  Petru Negură, “The Republic of Moldova’s Transition. Between a Failed Communism 
and an Un-Commenced Capitalism?”, in Studia politica. Romanian Polical Science 
Review, vol.XVI, no. 4, 2016, pp. 557-567; Anastasia Iarovoi, Jenifer Albert, Ludovica 
Smargiassi, “Republic of Moldova: Transition from communism to democracy”, New 
Eastern Europe, 16.05.2018, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/05/16/republic-moldova-
transition-communism-democracy/. (Accessed 14 July 2018).  
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paradigm, but which, in fact, has a mixed air, with many historicist and 
“patronalist” elements, which makes it difficult to define. As security and 
defense elements dominate Romania's regional policy paradigm, after the 
annexation of Crimea, the realistic framework may be considered dominant.  
In his doctoral thesis, Dorin Cimpoieșu analyzed the two decades 
between 1989, the year of national rebirth in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic, manifested as the struggle to replace the Cyrillic alphabet and the 
imposition of the Romanian language, in the context of Gorbachev’s Glasnost’, 
and the year 2009, the end of the Voronin administration. However, the 
Moldovan author, worked with all the clichés of Romanian historiography. His 
main critique concerning Romania was that it doesn’t have a national strategy 
that is “unitary, coherent and pragmatic, on medium and long term, regarding 
the Republic of Moldova”19. However, “Bessarabia” remains Romania’s number 
one priority in foreign policy having as “strategic objectives the economic 
integration and the consolidation of the common cultural and spiritual space”20. 
Additionally, another important problem Romania confronts, is it does not have 
enough financial resources to achieve economic, cultural, and spiritual 
integration with Moldova. The public funding is too meager for this project, 
believed Cimpoieșu, considering that this has more of a symbolic character, and 
could not cover the costs of large-scale projects21. In spite of all this, Bucharest's 
starting point is the historical right over the territory over the Prut and the 
Dnestr, from the commonality of kin, language, history, culture, that ties 
together the two “Romanian states”22. 
There are more problems, in addition to the lack of money. The first is 
the poor knowledge of Moldovan realities, and the profoundly emotional 
approach of the bilateral relation, which makes the elites in Bucharest, and even 
in Romanian society, repeat a number of errors made in the interwar period. 
Among them are the excessive politicization of the “Bessarabia problem”, and 
“exporting partisan ideology”23, considering that the political parties are 
interested in forming relations with Moldovan groups with the same 
orientation24. Other errors identified by Cimpoieșu in Romania's actions are: 
neglecting the complex psychology of a population which believes it has a 
“Moldovan” identity, a result of Soviet propaganda and Russification; treating 
the issue of “Bessarabia” as an electoral weapon; the lack of a complex and 
correct interpretation of the interests of Russia and Ukraine. In addition, the 
                                               
19  Dorin Cimpoieșu, Republica Moldova între România și Rusia 1989-2009, Casa Limbii 
Române Nichita Stănescu, Chișinău, 2010, p. 46.  
20  Ibidem, p. 49. 
21  Ibidem. 
22  Ibidem, p. 48.  
23  Ibidem, p. 50.  
24  Ibidem.  
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author admits that Chișinău does not manifest either a great interest for 
achieving “the unity of Romanian spirituality” since Moldovan statehood is 
supported by a local political class, which has ambitions of affirmation, and 
autonomy. All this in a context in which the long transition from Ceausescu to 
the EU and NATO integration prevented Romania from being attractive or 
become a model for the great mass of Moldovan citizens25. These shortcomings 
identified by Cimpoieșu are supposed to explain the success that Russia had in 
Moldova, together with the frozen conflict in Transdnestr as a main tool for 
blackmail used by Russia against the Republic of Moldova. Moscow has 
additional instruments such as Chișinău’s dependency on Russian energy 
resources, and on the Russian market for Moldovan agricultural foodstuffs and 
wines. We could add to that a strong network of Moscow loyalists through 
which Russia influences Moldovan politics, economy, and society26.  
 
 
The “Twitter Revolution” (2009) As A Reset Moment 
 
Relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova during the 
two terms in office held by Vladimir Voronin (2001-2009), the leader of the 
Party of Communists in the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) were dominated by 
tensions, which reached a climax when the two countries mutually expelled 
ambassadors in the spring of 2009, in the context of the violent protests on April 
the 7th. In the summer of 2009, after the Moldovan communists failed in their 
attempt to elect a speaker of Parliament, relations between Bucharest and 
Chișinău entered a new stage. As the domestic political crisis deepened in 
Chișinău, relations with Bucharest relaxed27. 
The result of the snap elections provided the opportunity to form a pro-
European coalition: the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), around the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (LDPM), led by PM Vlad Filat. The 
coalition also included the Liberal Party (LP), led by Mihail Ghimpu, whose 
nephew, Dorin Chirtoacă, was mayor of Chișinău, elected in 2007. Since 2009, 
the LP had the votes of the unionist electorate, which he had taken over from 
Iurie Roșca28, leader of the Christian Democratic Popular Party, compromised 
by its part in the coalition led by the PCRM. For many years a favorite of the 
Romanian Foreign Ministry, the Romanian Cultural Institute, and the Foreign 
                                               
25  Ibidem, pp. 50-51.  
26  Ibidem, pp. 52-54.  
27  “Relații politice”, http://Chișinău.mae.ro/node/167 (The Romanian Embassy in Chișinău's 
website). (Accessed 14 July 2018).   
28  “Iurie Roșca, slujbaș FSB al Moscovei la Chișinău. Nume de cod ‘Liderul’”, România 
Breaking News, 6 august 2014, https://romaniabreakingnews.ro/iurie-rosca-slujbas-fsb-al-
moscovei-la-chisinau-video/. (Accessed 14 July 2018).   
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Intelligence Service, Roșca now coordinates the Russian propaganda website 
sputnik.md, promoting in Romania, through book launches29 and translations, 
Aleksandr Dugin, one of the major ideologues of the Eurasian current, a 
supporter of the idea that Russia must oppose by any means Western powers 
and their values.  
In the autumn of 2009, the AEI was joined by the Democratic Party of 
Moldova (DPM), led by Dumitru Diacov, but financed and controlled by a 
mysterious character, Vladimir Plahotniuc30. The fourth party in the coalition 
was the Our Moldova Alliance, headed by Serafim Urechean. Only two of the 
four parties had solid relations with the political world in Bucharest, the DPM, a 
member of the Socialist International, and Ghimpu's Liberal Party, a member of 
the ALDE European political family, alongside the Romanian National Liberal 
Party, led by former PM Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, but close to unionist political 
groups, and by some figures associated with the president of Romania, Traian 
Băsescu. 
At that point, Romania had a chance to reset its relationship with the 
Republic of Moldova. The foreign context was favorable. The launch of the 
Eastern Partnership at the EU summit in Prague of May 2009 offered the 
European institutional framework though which Moldova could reinvent itself. 
In Bucharest, the second half of 2009 was marked by a political crisis, which 
put the issue of Moldova lower on the public agenda in Romania.  
 The beginning of the year 2009 meant the end of the trial in the Hague 
between Romania and Ukraine for dividing the continental shelf31. The 
aggressive way in which the ruling of the International Court of Justice was 
presented to the Romanian public, which was being compared to the creation of 
Greater Romania in 1918, caused many to consider it as a sort of historical 
vengeance against the East. The air was filled with the aggression of a frustrated 
nation, feeding a noisy nationalism, with little compatibility with the Euro-
Atlantic club that Romania had just joined. This episode, however, ended fairly 
quickly, but was taken note of by foreign observers and embassies. Thus, in a 
few months, when the government in Bucharest used the context of the “Twitter 
revolution” in Chișinău to change the paradigm of the bilateral Romania-
Moldova relationship, was seen with suspicion. The phrase that was obsessively 
                                               
29  Răzvan Filip, “Am fost la întâlnirea fanilor lui Putin din România și am aflat că gayii o să 
distrugă omenirea. Ideologul oficial al Kremlinului a venit la București și și-a lansat o 
carte într-o sală a Primăriei Capitalei, înconjurat de foști securiști și PRM-iști”, Vice, 6 
aprilie 2017, https://www.vice.com/ro/article/4xe99g/am-fost-la-intalnirea-fanilor-lui-
putin-din-romania. (Accessed 18 July 2018).  
30  Maria Levcenko, “Vlad Plahotniuc: Moldova’s man in the shadows”, 25 February 2016, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/maria-levcenco/vlad-plahotniuc-moldova-s-
man-in-shadows. (Accessed 15 May 2018). 
31  For details and backstage, see Bogdan Aurescu, Avanscena și culisele procesului de la 
Haga. Memoriile unui tânăr diplomat, Monitorul oficial, București, 2009.  
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repeated was that Romania had a “hidden agenda” in its relationship with 
Moldova32.  
Therefore, in 2009 Bucharest was forced somewhat to change its 
approach to its bilateral relationship with Chișinău, if it wanted to avoid 
colliding with Western governments. Also, foreign ministers Cristian 
Diaconescu (January – September 2009), then Teodor Baconschi (December 
2009 – January 2012) did not want to stay prisoner to obsolete approaches, the 
kind that caused image problems for Romania. Governing platforms, starting 
with the one of 2009, also reflected this change in approach33. 
Energy and education are mentioned as priority areas for collaboration. 
The Eastern Partnership, whose launch was seen with jealousy in Bucharest, 
because it was overshadowing the Black Sea Synergy promoted by Romania, 
was reevaluated and all of a sudden there was talk of taking advantage of it. 
Therefore, the document contains a lot of European Union, the Eastern 
Partnership, and less nationalist rhetoric. It is an important change, which 
occurred gradually after Romania joined the EU, on the 1st of January 2007.  
The achievements in the bilateral relationship between 2009 and 2012, 
during the Boc and Mihai Rãzvan Ungureanu governments, went beyond 
expectations. Practically, the list of priorities sketched by Bucharest in the 
summer of 2009 by Minister Diaconescu, was largely carried out: the strategic 
partnership, the small border traffic agreement, the opening of two more 
Romanian consulates, in Balti and Cahul, the inauguration of the “Mihai 
Eminescu” Romanian Cultural Institute, down to the last joint government 
session in Iași, co-presided over by Ungureanu, a few days before his 
government was dismissed by censure motion (May 7, 2012).  
After 2012, the government of the Social Liberal Union (SLU), made 
up of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Liberal Party (NLP) 
led by Victor Ponta, continued and developed the old projects dating back to the 
term held by Teodor Baconschi at the Foreign Ministry (December 2009- 
January 2012), adding a few new ones. The 2013-2016 governing platform is 
thicker, but the issue of the Republic of Moldova is given a lot of attention34. 
The relationship with the Republic of Moldova is mentioned in the document 
right after the strategic partnership with the US. Emphasis is placed on support 
for Moldova's European bid, on finalizing negotiations for the Association 
Agreement with the EU and the DCFTA and liberalizing the visa regime for 
Moldovan citizens. Details are provided for bilateral energy projects (the Iasi-
Ungheni gas pipeline, the above ground electrical lines Fălciu-Gotești and 
                                               
32  Interview with ambassador Teodor Baconschi, May 2013, Bucharest.  
33  “Programul de guvernare 2009-2012”, http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/guv200912/ProgramGuvern 
are.pdf. (Accessed 12 July 2018).   
34  “Programul de guvernare 2013-2016”, http://gov.ro/fisiere/pagini_fisiere/13-08-02-10-48-
52program-de-guvernare-2013-20161.pdf. (Accessed 14 July 2018).   
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Suceava-Bălți, etc.) It is important to emphasize the fact that the SDP, which 
held the foreign portfolio through Titus Corlățean (2012-2014) did not revert to 
the annexionist and revisionist rhetoric35 which it had promoted before, which 
would have worried Western governments, but continued the line of the Boc 
government, meaning treating the issue of the Republic of Moldova in a 
European paradigm.  
Between President Traian Băsescu and the government led by Victor 
Ponta, in their two years of cohabitation (2012-2014), there has been a veritable 
competition for control of the relationship with the Republic of Moldova, 
speculated by the Iurie Leancă government. The victory in the presidential 
elections in the autumn of 2014, by Klaus Iohannis, did not move from the 
government to the presidency the file of the bilateral relationship, as was to be 
expected. President Iohannis, with the exception of the February 2015 visit to 
Chișinău, where he thanked the people who voted for him, manifested no 
interest towards the Republic of Moldova. The following foreign ministers in 
the years of cohabitation, Bogdan Aurescu (Ponta government, 2015) and Lazăr 
Comănescu (Dacian Cioloș government, 2016), played “transition” roles, 
continuing older projects.  
However, it was precisely in these two years, that the Republic of 
Moldova foundered into a dramatic political crisis, a social and moral crisis that 
turned it from the “valedictorian” of the EaP into the “problem child”, and the 
West started to refer to Moldova as a “captive state”.  
Between September 2009 and January 2013, when the Pădurea 
domnească36 (“Princely Forest”), scandal erupted, the authorities in Bucharest 
avoided discriminating between its interlocutors in Bucharest, preferring some 
                                               
35  This was the fear of several embassies in Bucharest, especially because Corlățean’s 
appointment at the Minister for Foreign Affairs came after he had been Justice Minister 
during the time when Băsescu was being impeached, in the summer of 2012. In addition, 
Corlățean had held in the Năstase government the position of head of the Department of 
Romanians Abroad, where he made several nationalist statements, noted with concern by 
foreign diplomats accredited to Bucharest. Conversations with foreign diplomats in 
Bucharest (August- September 2012).  
36  On the 23rd of December, 2012, during a hunt at the Pădurea Domnească science reserve, 
it seems that General Prosecutor Valeriu Zubco, a close associate of DPM leader Vlad 
Plahotniuc, allegedly shot fatally a young man. Plahotniuc allegedly tried to cover up the 
case, afraid to lose and important cog in his power mechanism, the General Prosecutor, a 
position that went to the DPM as part of the protocol to form the Alliance for European 
Integration. In January 2013, a huge political scandal erupted, which resulted in 
Parliament dismissing the General Prosecutor, the dismissal of the deputy speaker of 
Parliament, Plahotniuc, and the fall of the Vlad Filat government. Valentina Basiul, 
“Parlamentul: Vânătorii de rang înalt din Pădurea Domnească să fie demişi, la fel şi toţi 
cei care au tăinuit producerea crimei”, Adevărul, 15.01.2013, https://adevarul.ro/ 
moldova/politica/vanatoareadin-padurea-domneasca-fostilegala-vanatorii-cei-implicati-
intainuirea-decesului-sorin-paciu-incalcat-sir-articole-codulpenal1511e0793344a7821184 
19153/index.html. (Accessed 12 July 2018). 
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against others, working openly with all the main parties, LDPM, LP, and the 
DPM and their leaders, the prime minister (PM) Vlad Filat, Mihai Ghimpu and 
Marian Lupu (in fact with Vladimir Plahotniuc, the real leader). Even though 
PM Filat was a member of the European Popular Party (PPE), just as the main 
party in the governing coalition in Bucharest was, the unionist Ghimpu was 
seen, not only in Bucharest, but across the world, as the politician that was 
closest to Traian Băsescu. It was a relationship that was more personal than 
anything, which did not influence – to Ghimpu's chagrin – the official political 
line in Bucharest. At their turn, the Moldovan democrats had a solid relationship 
with the SDP. This political balance between the three components of the AIE 
stayed in place until the Pădurea domnească scandal (January- April 2013). 
After that, the relative balance between the three parties in the governing 
coalition broke, to the advantage of the DPM.  
How did that happen? Through the agreement to set up AIE 237, whose 
annexes were revealed to the public, the DPM took political control of the 
General Prosecutor’s Office and the Center for Combating Economic Crime and 
Corruption38. In other words, the DPM appointed the leadership of these 
institutions, the General Prosecutor’s Office and the head of the department 
dedicated to fighting corruption. Another party, the LP for instance, appointed 
the leadership of no less important institutions, such as the Intelligence and 
Security Services and the National Bank of Moldova. The same with Filat's 
party. And, although the annexes of the agreement made it clear that the 
coalition parties simply cut Moldova into slices for themselves, distributing 
among themselves the ministries and their subordinated institutions, the 
political leaders saw this as a normal thing39. In time, the political control over 
the justice system, the General Prosecutor’s Office and anti-corruption, then the 
courts and courts of appeal, turned Plahotniuc into the most influential 
businessman and political figure in the Republic of Moldova40. He held the 
most effective weapon to fight against his economic competitors and political 
                                               
37  AIE 2 was formed after the 2010 parliamentarian election by LDPM, DPM and LP. Its 
majority increased from 53 seats to 59 by 101. The new cabinet was voted in January 
2011 led by Vlad Filat, the leader of the LDPM.  
38  “Acordul de Constituire al AIE a fost făcut public”, Unimedia, 18 ianuarie 2011, 
https://unimedia.info/stiri/doc-acordul-de-constituire-al-aie-a-fost-facut-public--vezi-
documentul-28687.html. (Accessed 14 July 2018); “Detalii din acordul secret al AIE”, 
Unimedia, 16 noiembrie 2011, https://unimedia.info/stiri/detalii-din-acordul-secret-al-aie-
41233.html. (Accessed 14 July 2018).   
39  “Ghimpu sparge ‘misterul’: Nu este nimic secret în anexele Acordului AIE2. Diacov: Ţin 
de bucătăria internă”, Unimedia, 20 ianuarie 2011, https://goo.gl/fa9Foy. (Accessed 14 
July 2018). 
40  Valentina Basiul, “Vlad Plahotniuc, om de afaceri, fost politician - o schiță de portret”, 
Radio Europa Liberă, 13.01.2016, https://www.europalibera.org/a/27329569.html. 
(Accessed 14 July 2018).  
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adversaries. And he could present to Western governments this veritable settling 
of accounts between the ex-Soviet mafia as a struggle against corruption, 
carried out in the name of European values.  
So Plahotniuc used in early 2013 the influence he had on the justice 
system to take Filat out of the equation for taking on the position of prime 
minister, as part of the new AIE 341 coalition. This is the beginning of the end 
for Vlad Filat. It was not the first slippage of the justice system in Moldova. 
Previously there had been several raider attacks42. Using judicial decisions, tens 
and hundreds of thousands, then millions of dollars were stolen, by changing 
the owners of some goods. However, the ruling – by blocking the appointment 
of Filat as PM - of the Constitutional Court (CC) was something new, 
dramatically influencing the political game, and opening up an era of 
unprecedented abuse in the ex-Soviet republics. Practically, one of the political 
players (DPM) was manipulating the arbiter (CC), pushing it to issue rulings 
only in its own favor.  
The brutal use of the justice system in the political game culminated 
with the invalidation, in June 2018, of the elections for the office of mayor of 
Chișinău. Andrei Năstase, a leader of the pro-European and anti-oligarchic 
opposition, who was disliked by Plahotniuc, won the elections43. It was 
something that had never happened before, even in Azerbaijan or Belarus.  
 
 
The SDP Bets On Plahotniuc 
 
Most likely, the government in Bucharest read through a partisan 
political filter the crisis caused by the crime at Padurea domneasca (the SDP and 
                                               
41  AIE 3 was formed after the Pădurea domnească political crisis, April 2013. The new cabinet 
was led by Iurie Leancă. “Noi dezvăluiri despre Mafia din RM”, 13 septembrie 2011, http://w 
ww.moldova.org/noi-dezvaluiri-despre-mafia-din-rm-224915-rom/. (Accessed 14 July 
2018); “Cei 12 ‘judecători raider’”, Ziarul de gardă, 26 ianuarie 2012, 
https://www.zdg.md/editia-print/investigatii/cei-12-judecatori-raider/comment-page-1. 
(Accessed 14 July 2018); “Firme implicate în atacurile raider sunt noii proprietari ai 
Moldasig”, Adevărul, 2 august 2012, https://adevarul.ro/moldova/economie/firme-
implicate-atacuri-raider-noii-proprietari-moldasig-1_50a ee5e57c42d5a663a18b00/index.html. 
(Accessed 14 July 2018); “Moldova-Agroindbank, supusă unui ATAC RAIDER fără 
precedent”, Ziarul național, 28 mai 2013, https://www.ziarulnational.md/moldva-
agroindbank-supusa-unui-atac-raider-fara-precedent/. (Accessed 14 July 2018); 
“Documen-tele care dovedesc implicarea lui Plahotniuc şi Candu în atacul raider asupra 
Victoriabank”, Jurnal de Chișinău, http://www.jc.md/documentele-care-dovedesc-
implicarea-lui-plahotniuc-si-candu-in-atacul-raider-asupra-victoriabank-doc/ (Accessed 
14 July 2018). 
43  Eugen Tomiuc, “Moldova's Andrei Năstase: The Man Who Would Be Mayor -- Or 
More”, Radio Free Europe, July 4, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-andrei-
Năstase-the-man-who-would-be-mayor-or-more/29336544.html. (Accessed 5 July 2018). 
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the DPM are members of the Socialist family). Ponta and Corlățean welcomed 
Filat's removal, as they considered him an ally of President Băsescu, their great 
political enemy44. Filat's removal opened the door for consolidating the 
influence of the SLU on the bilateral relationship, to the detriment of President 
Băsescu, with whom Ponta-Corlățean were in competition. That this was the 
most likely situation is confirmed by at least two details. Even though Romania 
had leverage over Chișinău, it preferred not using it, witnessing passively the 
twisting of legislation, carried out by Chief Justice of the CC, Alexandru 
Tănase, who was close to Bucharest45, and a personal enemy of Filat. Vlad 
Filat's replacement was former foreign minister and of European integration, 
Iurie Leancă, who entered into a close relationship with Ponta, so close that he 
was present on the National Arena when Ponta launched his presidential 
campaign in the autumn of 2014, even though Leancă is part of a different 
European political family, that of the European Popular Party. 
Starting with the spring of 2013 and up to today, the government in 
Bucharest has a favorite interlocutor, Vlad Plahotniuc. It is unlikely that the 
Social Democratic ideology is what unites Ponta, Corlățean and Plahotniuc, 
Moldova's richest man. It is very likely that the Plahotniuc project dates back to 
the Adrian Năstase government (2001-2004). The first decade after the fall of 
the USSR is a fairly hazy stage in Plahotniuc's biography. The mystery grows 
when it comes to the early 2000s, when, with support from the Năstase 
government, Plahotniuc was appointed, in 2002, general manager of Petrom 
Moldova, Petrom’s largest branch, itself the most important oil company in 
Romania.  
There are public indications that Plahotniuc was a higher-up in the 
criminal world46. He was invited to Cotroceni by President Ion Iliescu47 and 
                                               
44  Interview with a diplomat accredited to Chișinău by the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), who was visiting Bucharest periodically for meetings with FM official. He was 
intrigued by the aggressive support that Romania had for Plahotniuc, which had become 
obvious for foreign embassies since early 2013 (May 2013).  
45  Armand Goșu, “Anticorupție originală la Chișinău”, Revista 22, 
https://revista22.ro/60046/a nticorupie-original-la-chiinu.html. (Accessed July 23 2018). 
Unionist journalist Constantin Tănase (1949-2014), the father of judge Al. Tănase, edited 
the journal Timpul in Chișinău, for many years. He led the journal while being partially 
financed by the Romanian government in Bucharest, through various structures 
subordinated to the latter. 
46  Plahotniuc was on the Interpol list in Italy, wanted for belonging to a major criminal ring 
in Moscow. “Controversaţii care vor în Parlament. Inculpați, condamnați prinși cu mită și 
traseiști politici”, Ziarul de gardă, 16.10.2014, http://www.zdg.md/editia-
print/investigatii/conroversatii-care-vor-in-parlament-inculpati-condamnati-prinsi-cu-
mita-si-traseisti-politici. (Accessed 14 July 2018). “Investigație: ‘Omul din Umbră’ – 
Afacerile, interesele şi oamenii de legătură ai lui Serghei Iaralov şi Vlad Plahotniuc”, 
11.07.2016, http://actualitati.md/md/inve stigatie-omul-din-umbra-afacerile-interesele-si-
oamenii-de-legatura-ai-lui-serghei-iaralov-si-vlad-plahotniuc. (Accessed 14 July 2018); 
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introduced to Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, when the latter was on a 
visit to Romania in the autumn of 2002, as part of a group of successful 
business people. A few years later, Plahotniuc obtained from the authorities in 
Bucharest a new identity, with the name Vlad Ulinici48, with a different date of 
birth, with another Romanian passport, details revealed in the press a few years 
later49. It is possible that the young people who were then in the entourage of 
the SDP’s prime minister Năstase (Victor Ponta, Titus Corlățean, Bogdan 
Aurescu, Dan Mihalache), and who later occupied important positions in the 
Romanian state, being able to influence the relations with Moldova, to have 
known about Plahotniuc’s relationship with the SDP and members of the 
Năstase government50. In this case, the decision to support Plahotniuc, quietly 
contemplating how Filat was moved away, was equal to the decision to bet on 
the oligarch who holds the Moldovan state captive could be emotional rather 
than rational. In this case, Plahotniuc may rather be a SDP project.  
                                                                                                                   
“Afacerile Puterii și ale Opoziției: PlahotniucLeaks”, RISE Moldova, 18.05.2015, 
https://www.rise.md/articol/plahotniucleaks/ (Accessed 14 July, 2018); Corina Rebegea, 
“No Country for Oligarchs”, CEPA, January 28, 2016, 
http://cepa.org/index/?id=dfc406a9727d091df0eb6ffbce24345d. (Accessed 14 July 2018).  
47  Plahotniuc recounted the episode a few years after that, in an interview for Timpul: 'I met 
Voronin through former Romanian president Ion Iliescu, who made me the 
recommendation of being a dignified representative of Romanian investments in the 
Republic of Moldova. Of course, that, being the representative of such a large company 
[PETROM – author's note], which pays 3% of the country's budget, it was compulsory to 
have a communication relationship with the presidency. This fact itself set the press on 
fire and created the “controversial businessman”; Pavel Păduraru, “În exclusivitate pentru 
TIMPUL, Vlad Plahotniuc: «Eu am susţinut şi am să susţin orice guvernare»”, Timpul, 28 
mai 2010, https://www.timpul.md/articol/in-exclusivitate-pentru-timpul-vlad-plahotniuc-
eu-am-sustinut-si-am-sa-sustin-orice-guvernare-11378.html. (Accessed 14 July 2018). 
48  Alina Țurcanu, “Vladimir Plahotniuc, oligarh şi al treilea om în stat, are dublă identitate: 
una în Moldova, una în România”, Adevărul, 27.01.2011, https://adevarul.ro/ 
news/eveniment/vladimir-plahotniuc-oligarh-treilea-om-stat-dubla-identitate-moldova-
romania-1_50ad6e177c42d5a66394ff29/index.html. (Accessed 14 July 2018). 
49  Armand Goșu, “Republic of Moldova. The Year 2015 in Politics”, in Studia politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. XVI, nr. 1, 2016, pp. 30-33. Plahotniuc had an 
undeclared piece of property in Bucharest, in the Pipera residential area. Ana Poenariu, 
“Vila din București a oligarhului Plahotniuc”, RISE Moldova, 29.10.2016, 
https://www.rise.md/vila-din-bucuresti-a-oligarhului-plahotniuc/. (Accessed 14 July 
2018). 
50  In 2012-2015, Victor Ponta was prime minister, Titus Corlățean was foreign minister 
(2012-2014), Bogdan Aurescu was Secretary of State of Ministery of Foreing Affairs, 
holding the Republic of Moldova dossier portfolio (2010-2014) and minister of Foreing 
Affairs (2015). Dan Mihalache, former adviser for Adrian Năstase (2001-2004), after 
commuting for years between Bucharest and Chișinău as SDP representative in the 
relation with the DPM, between December 2014 and June 2016 he was the main adviser 
for President Iohannis, precisely during the period when Romania reaffirmed its support 
for Plahotniuc.  
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However, we should mention an important detail. Most often, both in 
Bucharest and in Chișinău, though this opinion is quite widespread among 
foreign analysts (Western, but also Russian), statements are made, under cover 
of anonymity, that Plahotniuc is the “project” of the Romanian Foreign 
Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informații Externe, SIE), which is difficult to 
verify51.   
The Pădurea domnească scandal, in early 2013, is a turning point in 
Moldova's political history, and inevitably, this moment also influenced the 
evolution of the relationship with Romania. This crisis was the result of tensions 
between Filat and Plahotniuc, in a country without democratic traditions, with 
weak institutions, political parties built around leaders, not doctrines, simple 
instruments in a fight for resources. As if in a criminal world ceremony52, the 
president of the most important pro-European party, Vlad Filat, publicly bowed 
to Plahotniuc for calling him a “puppeteer”, publicly begging forgiveness, in the 
hope of returning to his prime ministerial seat but to no avail. The CC decided 
that the person accused of corruption in a censure motion (a political 
document), passed by a vote, can no longer hold the position of premier53. Thus, 
the leader of the most important political party in Chișinău, the LDPM, was 
bizarrely removed from the main stage, where Ghimpu and Plahotniuc 
consolidated their position. Both are close to Bucharest, the first close to the 
NLP, but especially the entourage of President Băsescu, while the second is 
close to the SDP. The two Romanian parties, the SDP and the NLP formed in 
2013-2014 the Socialist Liberal Union, which had an overwhelming majority in 
Parliament.  
In spite of all this, this new version, the fourth, of the pro-European 
coalition, AIE, created after the parliamentary elections of November 201454, 
                                               
51  “Sturza: Plahotniuc a fost ‘salvat’ în 2016 de serviciile secrete românești”, Radio Orhei, 
http://radioorhei.info/sturza-plahotniuc-a-fost-salvat-in-2016-de-serviciile-secrete-
romanesti/. (Accessed 14 July 2018).   
52  For the criminal world phenomenon in the entire Soviet space, but especially in Russia, 
see the excellent book by Mark Galeotti, The Vory. Russia’s super mafia, Yale University 
Press, 2018.  
53  “Hotărârea Curții Constituționale nr. 4 din 22.04.2013”, http://constcourt.md/ 
ccdocview.php?tip=hotariri&docid=443&l=ro. (Accessed 10 May 2018). “3. In line with 
art. 1, par. (3), 101 par. (2), and 103 par. (2) of the Constitution: The Prime Minister of a 
Government dismissed by censure motion for suspicion of corruption is in the 
impossibility to exercise its attributions; - In case the Government is dismissed by censure 
motion for suspicion of corruption, the President of the Republic of Moldova has the 
constitutional obligation to designate an interim Prime Minister from among the members 
of the Government, one whose integrity is not tainted.”  
54  Corina Rebegea, Peter Doran, “Moldova’s Parliamentary Elections: European Values 
narrowly survive”, CEPA, December 2, 2014, http://cepa.org/content/moldova% 
E2%80%99s-parliamentary-elections-european-values-narrowly-survive. (Accessed 20 
January 2016).  
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had at its center once again Filat's party, because the LDPM had obtained, 
among pro-European parties, the largest number of votes55. Only a few weeks 
after the elections, the scandal irrupted and the “theft of the century” was 
announced. It was discovered that a billion dollars had disappeared from three 
banks, a huge amount for the poorest country in Europe, a disappearance that 
Plahotniuc allegedly was not unrelated to56.  
In Chișinău, a long string of protests and public gatherings started, 
attended by tens of thousands of citizens. During the spring and summer, 
several marathon protests took place, and in autumn, in front of the Parliament, 
three distinct tent camps were erected. The first one was that of the protesters in 
the market, organized by the Justice and Truth Platform, a civic movement that, 
in a few months, would turn into a political party. The other two, built later, are 
those of Igor Dodon's Socialists, and of Our Party, led by the controversial figure 
Renato Usatyi. The role of the latter – it came to light quite soon – was to 
compromise the anti-oligarchic protests generated by the theft of the billion dollars. 
And, in spite of the deepening crisis, Bucharest had no reaction. 
Foreign embassies, Western governments, high ranking officials, drew attention 
to the slippage in Moldova, deploring the fact that an entire country was taken 
over by one man, oligarch Plahotniuc, and called for the investigation of the 
robbery in the banking system. Romania was quiet. Not even the uncovering of 
the laundering of almost 20 billion dollars through Moldova, to the benefit of 
people in President Vladimir Putin's entourage, did not raise questions in 
Bucharest57. Ponta continued to visit Moldova several times a year, and 
Romanian-Moldovan projects were going better than ever. During his last visit 
to Chișinău, on the 26th and 27th of August 2015, Ponta went straight to the 
Nobil hotel to meet its owner, oligarch Plahotniuc, to the stupefaction of 
Moldovan ministers and prime minister, who were waiting for him with an 
honor guard at the government building58.  
                                               
55  “Alegerile parlamentare în Moldova din 30 noiembrie 2014”, http://www.e-
democracy.md/elections/parliamentary/2014/. (Accessed 15 July 2018). 
56  “Radiography Of A Bank Fraud In Moldova: From Money Laundering To Billion Fraud 
And State Debt”, Transparency International Moldova, 20.12.2016, 
https://www.transparency.md/ 2016/12/20/radiography-of-a-bank-fraud-in-moldova-from 
money-laundering-to-billion-fraud-and-state-debt/. (Accessed 12 July, 2018). Elena 
Dumitru, „Jaful secolului”: jurnaliştii străini demonstrează legătura lui Plahotniuc cu 
miliardul furat din băncile moldoveneşti, Adevărul, https://adevarul.ro/ 
international/europa/jaful-secolului- jurnalistii-straini-demonstreaza-legatura-plahotniuc-
miliardul-furat-bancile-moldovenesti-1_555b5575cfbe376e355eed8f/in dex.html. 
(Accessed 15 July 2018). 
57  Veaceslav Berbeca, Ion Tăbârță, “Puterea hibridă și actorii săi. Operațiunea 
“Laundromat”: analiza actorilor și acțiunilor întreprinse”, IDIS “Viitorul”, 
http://www.viitorul.org/files/1_3.pdf. (Accessed 14 June 2018).  
58  Interview with analyst Igor Boțan (September 2015, Chișinău).  
410  ARMAND GOȘU 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 3 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faced with more and more intense protests, the response of the 
oligarchic regime in Chișinău was to vote to lift parliamentary immunity for 
Vlad Filat (the DPM voted alongside the Socialists and the pro-Russian 
Communists) and to arrest the former PM on the 15th of October59. Predictably, 
such a move led to the fall of the government, generating an ample political 
crisis that shook to its core the political scene in Chișinău. The climax of the 
crisis was Plahotniuc's attempt to become prime minister of the Republic of 
Moldova himself. The attempt failed due to the mobilization of Western 
embassies in Chișinău, and also due to a bizarre incident, which indicated that 
Plahotniuc himself blackmailed President Nicolae Timofti60. Later on, the 
president said he had made a mistake, and that he had made those statements 
under the pressure of the emotions of the moment61. What is certain is that, 
within a few days, through blackmail and corruption, Plahotniuc managed to 
form a parliamentary majority (controlling over 51 deputies out of a total of 
101), in spite of the fact that, according to the results of the elections on the 30th 
of November, 2014, the DPM had only 19 deputies, fewer than three other 
political parties, the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, the LDPM, 
and the PCRM. 
 
 
The Dacian Cioloș (November 2015 – January 2017) 
Government, Missing The Reset 
 
The vote in Parliament in favor of Pavel Filip, the DPM candidate for 
prime minister, his swearing in the middle of the night (January 20), in a 
Chișinău paralyzed by protests, was possible in part due to effective support that 
Plahotniuc received from Bucharest, where a “technocrati” government had 
been recently installed, led by the former European Commissioner for 
Agriculture, Dacian Cioloș.  
On the 14th of January 2016, Romanian Foreign Minister Lazăr 
Comănescu seemed to have started the operation to convince Assistant 
Secretary of State Victoria Nuland to have the US openly, or at least tacitly, 
support Plahotniuc and his regime in Chișinău. The main thesis promoted by 
Romanian diplomacy was that this would be for the sake of stability. The two 
dignitaries were in Trakai, Lithuania, where they were taking part in an informal 
                                               
59  Armand Goșu, Euro-falia. Turbulențe și involuții în fostul spațiu sovietic, Curtea Veche, 
2016, pp. 177-178.  
60  Ibidem, pp. 191-196.  
61  “Nicolae Timofti: I told Plahotniuc afterwards that I was wrong”, 22 December 2016, 
https://en.publika.md/nicolae-timofti-i-told-plahotniuc-afterwards-that-i-was-wrong-
_2632485.html.  (Accessed 15 July 2018). 
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security meeting62, and that same day, in Bucharest, the newly minted 
ambassador of the Republic of Moldova, Mihai Gribincea, was at the Foreign 
Ministry to file a copy of his letter of accreditation. On this occasion, Romanian 
Secretary of State Radu Podgoreanu underlined the unprecedented “complexity” of 
the situation in the Republic of Moldova, which necessitates “the speedy 
formation in Chișinău of a government to ensure the stability of the country”63. 
The next episode came only four days after that, during the 18th of January 
visit to Bucharest of Victoria Nuland, which gave an opportunity to Romanian 
diplomacy to continue lobbying for Plahotniuc, which it had started doing in 
Lithuania64. This time, Nuland’s interlocutor was Secretary of State of Foreign 
Affairs Daniel Ionița, today Romanian ambassador to Chișinău. The official 
communiqué was neutral and did not refer to “stability”: “The two officials had a 
comprehensive exchange of ideas regarding the evolution of events in Romania's 
Eastern Neighborhood, favoring the situations in the Republic of Moldova, 
Ukraine, and the relationship with Russia”65. Despite this official statement, the 
Romanian media in Bucharest, and commentators from the Foreign Ministry 
entourage promoted the idea that the US and Romania, by supporting “political 
stability” in Chișinău, grant their agreement to the Plahotniuc government66. 
On the evening of the 20th of January 2016, the streets of Chișinău were 
taken over by tens of thousands of protesters, angry at the fact that, under the 
cover of the night, without observing legal provisions, the Filip government had 
been sworn in. At the same time, Romanian diplomats issued a statement 
through which they supported Plahotniuc:  
 
“The Foreign Ministry is following closely the events in Chișinău. We urge to calm, and 
appeal to all political actors in the Republic of Moldova to act with all possible 
responsibility for carrying out the democratic process of investing the Pavel Filip 
Government, government which obtained the vote of confidence of the legitimate 
Parliament in Chișinău.”67 
                                               
62  “Întrevedere Lazăr Comănescu - Victoria Nuland, în marja ‘Snow Meeting’”, 14.01.2016, 
“Both sides expressed concern with the present situation, at the same time underlining 
how important it was for political actors in the Republic of Moldova to be more aware of 
the need to act to maintin the country on a European path, in consonance with the interests 
of its citizens”.  http://www.mae.ro/node/35286. (Accessed 19 July 2018).  
63  “Primirea de către secretarul de stat Radu Podgorean, în vizită de prezentare, a 
ambasadorului Republicii Moldova la Bucureşti, Mihai Gribincea”, 14 January 2016, 
http://www.mae.ro/node/35282. (Accessed 19 July 2018).  
64  “Lobbying” it was the word used in various conversations by western diplomats in 
Bucharest (January-March 2016).  
65  “Consultările secretarului de stat pentru afaceri strategice Daniel Ioniţă cu asistentul 
secretarului de stat al SUA pentru afaceri europene şi eurasiatice Victoria Nuland”, 
18.01.2016,  http://www.mae.ro/node/35376. (Accessed 19 July 2018).  
66  Interview with analyst Igor Boțan (April 2016 Bucharest). 
67 “Comunicat de presă”, 20.01.2016, http://www.mae.ro/node/35431. (Accessed 19 July 
2018).  
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It is unlikely that in the entire Foreign Ministry Central Unit in 
Bucharest and the Romanian Embassy in Chișinău there was no one who knew 
that the DPM and Plahotniuc had not won the 2014 elections, but that it had 
won only 19 seats (out of 101), and that it had built its majority through 
blackmail and corruption, which made that majority illegitimate and immoral.  
That attitude on the part of Bucharest was rather bizarre for neutral 
observers. First of all, the SDP executive led by Ponta had just fallen. At the 
helm was former European Commissioner for Agriculture, Dacian Cioloș, 
whose political experience, at least theoretically, should have made him more 
attuned to sensibilities in Brussels related to events in Chișinău. On the contrary, 
the Cioloș government had taken in the entire leadership of Romanian 
diplomacy and copy-paste the political options in sensitive dossiers, such as the 
one on the relationship with the Republic of Moldova.  
The series of lobbying actions in favor of the Plahotniuc regime 
undertaken by the Romanian Foreign Ministry continued, on the 29th of January, 
with a briefing for the diplomatic missions of EU and NATO states accredited to 
Bucharest on the events in the Republic of Moldova, emphasizing the 
importance of “maintaining stability in the Republic of Moldova”, held the 
briefing68. For Bucharest, stability meant support for Plahotniuc, disparaging 
street protests generated by the theft of the billion dollars, and of the leaders of 
the pro-European and anti-oligarchic opposition, Maia Sandu and Andrei 
Năstase. A few months later, it was proven that the pretext given by Secretary of 
State Daniel Ioniță to the ambassadors, claiming that if Plahotniuc lost power 
snap elections would have to be held, and would be won by the pro-Russian 
Igor Dodon, was ridiculous, as it was contradicted by the evolution of events.  
Due to pressure from Brussels69, which was disappointed in the way in 
which the “European technocrat” team in Bucharest had managed the crisis in 
Chișinău, the Cioloș government tried to save face by issuing a letter on the 30th 
of January 2016, with vague conditions for the payment of an initial tranche of 
60 million Euros of the 150 million loan granted to the Republic of Moldova70. 
Money was the most important instrument – given the crisis caused by the theft 
                                               
68  “Susţinerea de către secretarul de stat Daniel Ioniţă a unui briefing de informare pe tema 
evoluţiilor din Republica Moldova”, 29.01.2016, http://www.mae.ro/node/35537. 
(Accessed 19 July 2018).  
69  Interviews with public servants working for the Commission (February 2016).  
70  “Premierul Dacian Cioloș a trimis astăzi omologului său din Republica Moldova, Pavel 
Filip, o scrisoare care detaliază conținutul discuțiilor avute la București în data de 26 
ianuarie 2016 în legătură cu acordul de împrumut dintre România și Republica Moldova”, 
30 January 2016, http://gov.ro/ro/media/comunicate/premierul-dacian-ciolo-a-trimis-
astazi-omologului-sau-din-republica-moldova-pavel-filip-o-scrisoare-care-detaliaza-
continutul-discutiilor-avute-la-bucure-ti-in-data-de-26-ianuarie-2016-in-legatura-cu-
acordul-de-imprumut-dintre-romania-i-republica-moldova&page=1. (Accessed 19 July 
2018).  
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of the billion dollars – to pressure the establishment in Chișinău in order to keep 
Moldova on track towards the West. Considering that the East, meaning Russia, 
could not give money to Moldova even if it wanted to, due to international 
sanctions applied because of its annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of 
Donbass, and especially because of the drop in the price of oil.  
In Chișinău, the non-parliamentary opposition, through its two leaders, 
Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase, was disappointed by the support shown by 
Romania for Plahotniuc. It is a disappointment that lasts to this day. The doors 
of institutions in Bucharest will remain closed to the two, not only at the 
Foreign Ministry or at the Cotroceni Presidential Palace, but also in Parliament 
or various ministries, where any contact with Sandu and Năstase is blocked.  
In February 2016, some influential personalities71 in Moldovan civil 
society expressed their utter shock at the lack of empathy on the side of 
Bucharest with the plight of the population across the Prut. Moreover, they 
expressed their opinion that the Romanian government will not go through even 
with these minimal conditions. A few months later, on the 24th of August, in a 
long press release, the government announced that PM Cioloș would visit 
Chișinău. He was accompanied by a delegation of ministers (Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Regional Development and Administration Vasile 
Dâncu; Energy Minister Victor Grigorescu; Public Finance Minister Anca 
Dragu; Justice Minister Raluca Prună; Minister for European Funds Cristian 
Ghinea; Delegate Minister for Relations with Romanians Abroad Maria Ligor.) 
Only Băsescu had taken over the Prut more ministers, when he had visited in 2010. 
The following paragraph from the Cioloș government press release is 
significant:  
 
“The visit to Chișinău of the Romanian delegation led by PM Dacian Cioloș comes in 
the context of the release of the first tranche, worth 60 million Euro, of the reimbursable 
loan for the Republic of Moldova today, 24 August […] as a result of noting results in 
living up to commitments made to this end by the Republic of Moldova.”72 
 
As if 60 million were not sufficient, the Cioloș government also 
approved a loan worth 5 million Euro for investments in preschool 
infrastructure73.  
                                               
71  For example, the president of the Moldova PEN Club, Vitalie Ciobanu, “România și 
Marea Adunare Națională de la Chișinău”, Revista 22, 26.01.2016, https://revista22.ro/ 
70251547/romnia-i-marea-adunare-naional-de-la-chiinu.html. (Accessed 17 July 2018).  
72 “Premierul Dacian Cioloş va merge în vizită oficială la Chișinău”, 24 august 2016, 
http://gov.ro/ro/media/comunicate/premierul-dacian-Cioloș-va-merge-in-vizita-oficiala-
la-chi-inau&page=9. (Accessed 19 July 2018).  
73  “Comunicat de presă - ședință de guvern - Asistență financiară pentru investiții în 
infrastructura preșcolară și programe adresate comunităților locale din Republica 
Moldova”, 24 august 2016. (Accessed 17 July 2018).  
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With Plahotniuc To The Bitter End! 
 
On the 4th of March 2016, in another bizarre decision, the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Moldova reintroduced presidential elections in a 
parliamentary republic. Even though the presidential vote had the potential to 
break apart the anti-oligarchic front, by Năstase’s withdrawal and the support 
granted to Maia Sandu, the pro-European group, even though it lost the 
elections, came out stronger. In the second round, on 13 November, pro-Russian 
Igor Dodon faced off against pro-European Maia Sandu. As if to contradict 
Bucharest's narrative, Plahotniuc helped pro-Russian Igor Dodon. Daniel Ioniță, 
appointed ambassador to Chișinău on 23 May 2016 by President Iohannis, did 
not come out with a press release, and didn't explain the logical fracture in 
Romanian diplomacy’s attitude. So it turns out that the Russian threat narrative 
was valid only if the leaders of the non-parliamentary opposition, Sandu and 
Năstase, organized protests. When Plahotniuc supported Dodon in grabbing the 
presidency, the Russian threat ceased to exist. 
Bucharest was extremely active in 2016 in relation to Chișinău. 
Countless announcements of encouragement and official visits were made. On 
26 January, Pavel Filip came to Bucharest, calling for the unblocking of the 150 
million Euro loan promised by Romania. The discussion with Cioloș gave him 
great hope, and rightly so. On the 14th of April, a deputy foreign minister from 
Moldova was received in Bucharest by Minister Comănescu and Secretary of 
State Ioniță. According to the Romanian Foreign Ministry press release, the 
Romanian dignitaries spoke about “the positive evolution of events registered in 
the last few months in promoting reforms”. Comănescu assured the Moldovan 
dignitary that “Romania will give full support needed for reforms... 
[Comănescu] added that progress in this area is directly relevant for meeting, in 
the near future, the conditions necessary for the transfer of the first tranche of 
the 150 million Euro loan offered by Romania”74. One day later, in Bratislava, 
at the GLOBSEC, Comănescu met Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Galbur, 
and assured him of the “strong support” that Romania provides to his country75. 
In May, the Minister for Romanians Abroad made a three-day visit to Chișinău. 
On this occasion they once again touted the thesis of “consolidating stability” in 
the Republic of Moldova76. 
                                               
74  “Consultări politice cu Republica Moldova”, 14.04.2016, http://www.mae.ro/node/36675. 
(Accessed 19 July 2018). 
75  “Participarea ministrului afacerilor externe, Lazăr Comănescu, la conferința internațională 
GLOBSEC 2016”, 14.04.2016, http://www.mae.ro/node/36681. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
76  “Vizita ministrului delegat Dan Stoenescu în Republica Moldova”, 15 May 2016, 
http://www.mae.ro/node/37035. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
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The peak of diplomatic lobbying to consolidate the Plahotniuc regime 
came in the summer of 2016, when Minister Comănescu visited the Republic of 
Moldova together with the Secretary of State for European Affairs of the French 
Foreign Ministry, Harlem Desir. Comănescu and Desir were also co-presidents 
of the Republic of Moldova's Group for European Action, initiated by former 
minister Baconschi in January 2010. This French-Romanian pair promoting the 
Republic of Moldova in Brussels did not function for a time. But, after Cioloș's 
visit to Paris, where he was received by French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, 
with whom he signed the updated roadmap of the bilateral Strategic Partnership, 
this Group for European Action was relaunched, and the two ministers, 
Comănescu and Desir, visited Chișinău on the 16th and 17th of June. The 
message at the meeting with President Timofti and PM Filip was the same: 
“consolidating stability”. Even at the meeting with the pro-European opposition 
leaders, Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase, the message was similar: according to 
a press release from the Foreign Ministry in Bucharest, the two dignitaries 
underlined “the importance of maintaining stability”, and political debates 
regarding the presidential elections in the autumn “must stay within existing 
democratic frameworks, and not affect the ongoing processes of relaunching 
reforms and consolidating stability in the Republic of Moldova”77. In other 
words, the opposition in Chișinău should get its act together and stop bothering 
the Plahotniuc regime, because that would affect Moldova's stability. The two 
ministers then met experts from civil society, Igor Munteanu, Igor Boțan, 
Arcadie Barbăroșie etc. In an almost surreal move, Comănescu – according to 
the official FM press release – called on them to “maintain their impartiality and 
rigorous way to tackle public debate issues”78. Which means that Boțan, 
Barbăroșie etc. were neither “impartial”, nor “rigorous”.  
The 23-25 of August visit by Prime Minister Cioloș, followed by 
Romania handing over the loan tranche, right before the start of the election 
campaign in Moldova, did not help the DPM candidate much. Marian Lupu was 
withdrawn from the presidential race by Plahotniuc, as he was ranked modestly, 
around the middle of the list of candidates79. Pro-Russian Igor Dodon's victory 
in the presidential elections with Plahotniuc's support80 did not, surprisingly, 
                                               
77  “A doua zi a vizitei comune la Chişinău a ministrului afacerilor externe, Lazăr 
Comănescu, şi secretarului de stat pentru afaceri europene în MAE francez, Harlem 
Désir”, 17 June 2016, http://www.mae.ro/node/37515. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
78  Ibidem. 
79  Corina Rebegea, “East Meets West in Moldova’s Presidential Elections”, CEPA, 
November 3, 2016, http://cepa.org/East-meets-West-in-Moldovas-presidential-elections 
(accessed on 18 December 2016).  
80  The media controlled by Plahotniuc unleased, during the last weeks of the campaign, but 
also during the two rounds of voting, an aggressive fake-news campaign against Maia 
Sandu, who was accused of having the intention to allow 30.000 Syrians to emigrate to 
Moldova, of being a lesbian, of leading an immoral life, of being corrupt, etc. The chief 
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change Bucharest's attitude towards the political regime in Chișinău, as the 
Moldovan oligarch continued to enjoy not only confidence, but also support 
from the state authorities in Romania. DPM signed a collaboration agreement 
not only with United Russia, President Vladimir Putin's party, but also with the 
SDP, a member of the Socialist International. The signing ceremony, taking 
place at the central headquarters of the SDP, in September 2014, was attended, 
in addition to PM Ponta, by Foreign Minister Corlățean and by Liviu Dragnea, 
current chairman of the SDP81. The first collaboration agreement between the 
SDP and the DPM was signed in 2006, being periodically renewed since then.  
The decisive victory by the SDP in the 2016 elections brought only 
stylistic changes in the relationship with the Republic of Moldova. The 
successive SDP governments in 2017-2018 reduced the frequency of contacts, 
but stayed on target, unconditionally supporting the increasingly authoritarian 
regime installed by Plahotniuc. The best proofs are the three governing 
platforms, which remained unchanged in what concerns their Moldova chapter. 
Even if they borrow much from Ponta's platform, what is lacking is the 
enthusiasm of the prime minister. In two years’, time, between August 2013 and 
August 2015, Ponta had visited the Republic of Moldova eight times, setting a 
record that is hard, even impossible, to ever beat. Instead of four visits a year, 
his successors as heads of government made a single visit to Chișinău and 
invited their Moldovan counterparts to Bucharest also once a year.  
The consolidation of the political situation in Moldova and the positions 
of the Filip government in Chișinău are also reflected in the agenda of talks 
with Romanian dignitaries. The phrase “consolidating stability” disappeared, 
replaced by some more concrete talks on energy and transportation 
                                                                                                                   
TV channels involved in the campaign belong to Plahotniuc’s media holding and include 
Prime TV and news channel Publika TV. During the day of the election, local authorities 
controlled by MDP organized the movement of tens of busses in Transnistria, transporting 
citizens to polling stations from East of the Dniester where pro-Russian candidate, Igor 
Dodon, had a better standing in polls. Audio recordings of a close collaborator of 
Plahotniuc, Constantin Botnari, were also revealed. In them, the latter declared that in the 
electoral campaign of the fall 2016, the enemies of MDP were Maia Sandu (who 
presented her candidacy against pro-Russian Dodon) and Andrei Năstase, and that Dodon 
was not competing against MDP. Exclusive audio : “Dodon nu ne este concurent: 
Indicațiile lui Botnari, alias Borsetka, în timpul prezidențialelor din 2016”, 
http://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/026a2e5986fbb8cc/live-cabinetul-din-umbra-audio-cu-botnari- 
dand-indicatii-celor-din-pd-sa-l-promoveze-pe-dodon-in-timpul-alegerilor-din-2016.html. 
(Accessed 24 July 2018). 
81  Maxim Pulber, “Democrații moldoveni și social-democrații români se vor susține reciproc 
în alegeri”, Realitatea, 10 September 2014, http://www.realitatea.md/democra-ii-
moldoveni-i-social-democra-ii-romani-se-vor-sus-ine-reciproc-in-alegeri-ne-vor-facilita-
accesul_8781.html (accessed on 19 July 2018); “Vlad Plahotniuc salutes signing of 
cooperation agreement between PDM and Romanian PSD”, 07.10.2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kX8EXjTih3A. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
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interconnection, as well as about the participation of Romanian companies in 
the privatization process in Moldova82. The political instability in Bucharest, but 
also the meager capacity of the SDP governments to implement their own 
decisions, prevented the projects from advancing. In fact, Chișinău is interested 
in the loans from Romania, not the process of certain projects.  
 
 
The Centennial In Bucharest And Chișinău: 
Operetta Unionism 
 
As the year 2018 is celebrated in Bucharest as the Greater Romania 
Centennial, including the union of Bessarabia and Romania, it was an occasion 
to test relations between the SDP and the DPM, and the way in which Moldovan 
dignitaries respond to the sensibilities of the government of Romania.  
On the 27th of March, (9 April new style, according to the Gregorian 
calendar) the day that marked 100 years from the union of Bessarabia and 
Romania, the Romanian Parliament, in solemn joint session, adopted a 
“Declaration for the celebration of the union of Bessarabia with Motherland 
Romania”83. The document considers “fully legitimate” the wishes of those who 
support “the unification of the two states” and insures that “Romania and its 
citizens are and will always be prepared to welcome any organic manifestations 
for reunification on the side of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova”84. The 
document does not detail in which way the unionists in the Republic of 
Moldova would be supported by Bucharest, making plausible any speculation.  
The solemn session in Bucharest was also attended by a delegation 
from the Parliament in Chișinău, led by its speaker, Andrian Candu. However, 
President Klaus Iohannis was absent, resuming himself to sending a message 
about the need to “deepen the strategic partnership” between Romania and the 
Republic of Moldova, as well as talking about Bucharest's commitment to 
support Chișinău’s efforts to join the EU85. The Romanian president's message 
                                               
82 “Întrevederea ministrului delegat pentru Afaceri Europene, Victor Negrescu, cu 
viceministrul afacerilor externe şi integrării europene al Republicii Moldova, Daniela 
Morari”, 28.07.2017, http://www.mae.ro/node/42698. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
83 “Declarație pentru celebrarea unirii Basarabiei cu Țara Mamă, România, la 27 martie 
1918”, 
http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/oz/20180327_declaratie.pdf. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
84  Ibidem.  
85  Alina Neagu, “Mesajul lui Klaus Iohannis la aniversarea unui secol de la unirea 
Basarabiei cu România: Unul dintre momentele care definesc pentru totdeauna istoria și 
țin treze conștiințele, Hotnews, 27.03.2018, https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-
22365708-mesajul-lui-klaus-iohannis-aniversarea-unui-secol-unirea-basarabiei-romnia-
unul-dintre-acele-momente-care-definesc-pentru-totdeauna-istoria-tin-treze-constiintele-
generatie-dupa-generatie.htm. (Accessed 16 July 2018). 
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was in stark contrast to the discourses given by the speakers of the two 
chambers of Parliament, Calin Popescu-Tariceanu and Liviu Dragnea. The latter 
invoked, in favor of the union, the Helsinki Final Act, and called on those 
present at the solemn session to be more daring in enacting the union of Romania 
with the Republic of Moldova. Liviu Dragnea, the chairman of the SDP, the main 
governing party, wants the union with the Republic of Moldova. “Romania was 
strong when it was united. And it will be united. This is our ideal”86. 
 
“Don't we have the courage to say clearly what we want? And, so that there is no 
confusion, I say it openly, simply, and explicitly – I want to unite with the Republic of 
Moldova! I want us to be together in Europe, as a single nation. Romania was stronger 
when it was united. And it will be united. And it will be strong. This is our ideal.”87 
 
With this statement, Dragnea was competing with former president 
Traian Băsescu, who had been more and more active with regard to the 
Republic of Moldova in the last few years. Băsescu had taken part in a unionist 
meeting in Chișinău, on Sunday, the 25th of March, attended by 15,000 people at 
the most, where a proclamation was adopted calling on the Bucharest 
Parliament to get involved in the “Peaceful reunification of the nation”. Traian 
Băsescu spoke at the meeting, calling on the two parliaments to vote once again 
on the union, just as they had done 100 years before. Moreover, the former 
president called on the union with the Republic of Moldova to be Romania's 
third country project, after the first had been finalized, joining NATO and the 
EU respectively88. 
 
“We call on the parliaments in Bucharest and Chișinău to vote on the union once again. 
[…] The union is what Romania and the Republic of Moldova need. If Romania has 
two great objectives. 1: to secure entry into NATO, which it did; 2: to ensure its 
prosperity and join the EU. The third country objective must be reunification.”89 
 
More leaders attended the unionist meeting in Chișinău from Bucharest. 
Until the 27th of March, the most active promoter of unionism in Romania 
seemed to be the former president Traian Băsescu, and in the Republic of 
Moldova the leaders of the Liberal Party of Mihai Ghimpu, as well as the newly 
set up Party of National Unity, headed by Anatol Șalaru, former defense 
minister in Chișinău.  
                                               
86  “Dragnea: ‘Vreau să ne unim cu Moldova. Vreau să fim împreună în Europa, dar ca o 
singură națiune’”, Hotnews, 27 March 2018, https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-
22365501-dragnea-vreau-unim-moldova-vreau-fim-impreuna-europa-dar-singura-
natiune.htm. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
87  Ibidem.  
88  “Discurs Traian Băsescu Chișinău 25 martie 2018 Marea Adunare Centenara”, 
25.03.2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBVtu31IJl0. (Accessed 19 July 2018).  
89  Ibidem. 
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In the Republic of Moldova, the Popular Movement Party, led by Traian 
Băsescu, was, according to polls, on the brink of entering Parliament. For a long 
time, the most vocal parties on the issue of the unification with Moldova were 
small and, on the fringes, and were in the opposition. They were trying to 
mobilize as large a segment as they could of a pro-unionist electorate, which has 
grown from 18% to 25% in the last quarter century in the Republic of 
Moldova90. Initially it was the people voting for the National Front, then those 
voting for the Christian Democratic Popular Party, led by Iurie Roșca, and, 
more recently, for the Liberal Party.  
The percentage of voters in favor of the union was never large enough 
to change the political trajectory of the Republic of Moldova. A recent opinion 
poll, in December 2017, set at 21% the segment of Moldovans who would vote 
in favor of union with Romania. However, more than half, 56.2%, would be 
against the union, according to the same poll91. Conversely, in Romania, a 
January 2018 poll found that only 27% of citizens believe the union with the 
Republic of Moldova necessary or very necessary92. These figures explain why 
the topic of the union was never embraced by major parties until very recently. 
The subject was a favorite of small parties, which appealed to a minor 
electorate, but one, that was extremely active and politicized, electing these 
parties in Parliament.  
If in Moldova, the topic of the union remains the province of smaller 
parties, in Romania, after the 27th of March, the unification project was 
embraced by the SDP chairman Liviu Dragnea, the head of the most important 
political party, and perhaps the most influential politician in Bucharest right 
now. 
The Democratic Party of Moldova, which controls the government in 
Chișinău, in spite of the fact that it is close to the SDP, its colleague in the 
Socialist International, does not display unionist tendencies, and the party 
statute sets the aim of building in Moldova a Moldovan civic nation, which 
Bucharest refuses to accept even as an intellectual debate topic, arguing that the 
Moldovan nation is a concept concocted by Stalin.  
 
 
                                               
90  Interviews with analysts Igor Boțan, Arcadie Barbăroșie, and Petru Negură (September 
2015, Aprile 2016, Chișinău). 
91  “BOP 2017: 1/3 dintre cetățenii R. Moldova ar vota pentru unirea cu Rusia”, Agora, 14 
decembrie 2017, http://agora.md/stiri/40151/bop-2017-1-3-dintre-cetatenii-r--moldova-ar-
vota-pentru-unirea-cu-rusia. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
92  Florin Pușcaș, “Sondaj CURS: Două treimi dintre români consideră că unirea cu 
Republica Moldova este puțin sau deloc necesară”, Știri pe surse, 18 January 2018, 
https://www.stiripesurse.ro/sondaj-curs-pentru-stiripesurse-ro-doua-treimi-dintre-romani 
considera-ca-unirea-cu-republica-moldova-este-pu-in-sau-deloc-necesara_1243396.html. 
(Accessed 18 July 2018).  
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Who Controls The Relationship With The Republic Of 
Moldova? 
 
From the “Twitter revolution” in the spring of 2009 in Chișinău to this 
day, the Romanian presidency and the foreign minister have been a team and 
have had the same political color for only two years, between December 2009 
and January 2012. This is the period when the Republic of Moldova’ dossier 
was handled by the Foreign Ministry. Even if there were still clogs in the 
system, be it at the presidency or at the Foreign Ministry, the relationship 
between Băsescu and Baconschi ensured coherence in the eastern policy, 
especially in the Bucharest-Chișinău bilateral relationship. Once the ministry 
was taken over by Corlățean, the situation changed. A fierce competition started 
between President Băsescu and the Ponta government for control of the bilateral 
relationship with the Republic of Moldova. Ponta got personally involved, and 
the prime minister unblocked with determination many of the projects that for 
years had only been talked about, but never acted upon. As a result, in 2014 the 
Ponta government overcame Băsescu, and the Socialist-Liberal Union ministers 
limited his range of action to security, in a very tense regional context, 
dominated by Crimea's annexation by Russia and the destabilization of 
Donbass. This regional context, shaped by the Russian threat, and the lack of 
other institutional tools, pushed Băsescu to use more and more the intelligence 
services that he controlled through the Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării 
(Higher Defense Council) as foreign policy tools.  
Klaus Iohannis’ victory in the elections of 2014 and Ponta's weakened 
position, still allowing him to be premier for another year, made foreign policy 
become an increasingly important issue. The Russian threat, which intelligence 
services knew how to dangle over everyone's heads to get maximum advantages 
(larger budgeting, control over certain embassies and directorates within the 
Foreign Ministry), was a factor that encouraged this process. The President 
Klaus Iohannis, who was preoccupied to differentiate himself from his 
predecessor, Traian Băsescu, who was very careful with the bilateral 
relationship with Chișinău, showed no interest in this dossier. This context 
favored the intelligence services, which consolidated their control and became 
more autonomous, but were left directionless, because, as militarized 
institutions, they no longer had a commander to guide them.  
The blockage in Romania’s foreign policy as of September 2014, when 
the SDP and DPM signed a collaboration protocol in Bucharest, was not to be 
laid at the feet of the intelligence services and the presidential administration 
entirely, but also at those of the Foreign Ministry, which was completely 
paralyzed, in a crisis of expertise, being fought over by no less than four 
ministers, Deputy Prime Minister Ana Birchall, Foreign Minister Teodor 
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Meleșcanu, the Minister of European Affairs, and the Minister of Romanians 
Abroad. For the time being, Romania remains dependent on Plahotniuc in its 
foreign policy with regard to the Republic of Moldova and gives no signs that it 
is about to change this dependency. 
 
 
